THE KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY: THE
RIGHT TO EXIST IS NOT ENOUGH...
|
By Nurcan Baysal, Dilan Bozgan and
Nina Henkens
Published in SÜDOSTEUROPA Mitteilungen, 05-06 2011, 51. Jahrgang
Introduction
For the last
few years there has been a general feeling of losing momentum and general
ignorance of the Kurdish people and their problems. There are a few different
perspectives to the Kurdish question in Turkey. For some it is an
underdevelopment and economic problem, for most it is an identity problem. The
authors argue that there is a need to consider both of them together, not
separately. They also argue that the inability to openly discuss the main
causes of the problems for Kurdish people, which is the armed conflict in the
southeast, is hindering development and the peace process in a very important
way.
The report
will not consist of a theoretically based political analysis but will address
the everyday difficulties for people living in the Kurdish regions, which the
authors consider to be the biggest obstacles for a durable peaceful solution of
the conflict.
Forced
Migration
The massive forced migration of
villagers is on of the most important results of the thirty year old conflict
between the Turkish army forces and the PKK. This forced migration has
intensified in the period between 1990-95 and affected 1,200,000 people
according to official figures while civil society organizations suggest the
figure as high as 1.5 to 3 million[1].
To give an example, the population of Diyarbakir doubled in such a short period
of time as 5 years. Many of the issues that the Kurds, and especially the most
vulnerable groups such as women and children, are facing today are linked to
forced migration.
The Kurds who were forced to migrate
because of the ongoing fights were mostly villagers. Their migration was often
accompanied by the loss of family members but also their land, houses, live
stock and belongings. In the cities, they were confronted with the loss of
their livelihoods as their farming skills can not be used in the urban labor
market, leading to very extreme urban poverty. A big portion of them is illiterate
and especially women sometimes don't speak Turkish, which makes it difficult
for them to integrate in the city and make use of state services such as
administration, welfare schemes, health care and education.
Following a large number of
applications to the European Court of Human Rights, in March 2004, about 14
years after the displacement, a compensation law was adopted (which was called
the Law no. 5233 on Compensation of Damages and Losses Arising from Terror and
Fight against Terrorism). Not only were the amounts of the compensations
insufficient and the time it took to finalize the procedures often very long,
sometimes as long as four years, the deadline application ended in May 2008[2].
It should also be noted that, although
to a lesser extent, the Turkish government is holding on to their policy of
forced evictions in the Kurdish regions, notably by damn-building as part of
the South east Development project. For example, the much contested plan of
building the Illisu Dam in the Hasankeyf region (near Batman) is claimed to
cause the flooding of 183 villages and hamlets.
Village
Guards
Another very important result of the
war is the village guard system.
Village guards are paramilitary groups
of villagers that are armed and paid by the state with the aim of 'defending
themselves against PKK.'[3]
This is the official aim laid down in the law. The village guards system lead
to armament of civilians which left the public security issue in the hands of
private groups and individuals thus leading to the division of the
community into two; either "ally of
the state" or "enemy of the state." Therefore, the so-called
"opponents of the state", who were mostly forced to migrate to the
cities, have become subject to all kinds of human rights violations.[4] On
the other hand the ones who accepted to be village guards have a privileged
position.
Since 1985 the village guards system
has been implemented in 35 provinces of Turkey. Depending on the Ministry of
Interior statistics in 2009, 60.000 village guards and 23.000 voluntary village
guards have been recruited.[5]
Considering that the whole family is involved in the system and regarding the
big family sizes in the Region,[6] it
is possible to say that almost a million people are involved in the system of
village guards.
The village guard system is not only a
big security threat to the local villagers, it is also an obstacle for economic
development in many ways. Firstly, a sizable portion of the villagers is no
longer producing but receiving salaries as village guards. Secondly, the
presence of village guards is an obstacle for the forced migrated population to
return safely to their villages. A lot of the abandoned land has been seized by
the village guards.
The Turkish policy on village guards is
very unclear. Although the government has stated many times that they wanted to
abolish the system, mainly because it is turning towards them, in 2004 orders
were given to the governors of the eastern provinces to recruit more village
guards[7].
Underdevelopment
and Poverty
Even though there are also other
reasons for the poverty of the Kurdish regions, the war certainly is a key
factor in the current underdevelopment.
Also here, the fact of not recognizing the
main causes of this problem and the mutual mistrust between the appointed
representatives of the central government and the locally elected
municipalities is hindering development in a serious way.
The
line separating eastern and western regions of Turkey is a concern for the EU,
which fears the destabilizing effect and lack of cohesion caused by vast
socioeconomic inequality within a member country. In short, borrowing from a
World Bank (2001) report,[8]
“the level of economic development declines from west to east, such that while
the west broadly resembles a West European industrial economy, the east is
still in many respects akin to a developing economy”. 60% of the Kurdish
population is living under the poverty line.
According
to a study carried out by the Union of South East Anatolian Region
Municipalities[9],
in spite of holding 16% of the population, the region's local administration
budget share is only 8, 5%. We can explain this by the fact that the
municipalities can not raise a lot of taxes with their own poor
population. Also, the lack of
infrastructure and the ongoing conflict and the mistrust between local
municipalities and bureaucrats hinders effective realization of investments in
the Region. Thus, we are confronted with a vicious circle of underdevelopment
and underinvestment in the region.
It
can not be said that the current government is not taking any initiative to
fight poverty and underdevelopment. In fact, it is thanks to the AKP ministries
that all Turkish villages have now water and roads[10].
Also, the Green Card, which provides free healthcare for people under a certain
poverty level, increased in scope during the AKP government[11].
But a closer look at especially the social services and projects in the cities
shows us that the government aid is not always neutral in the region. For example, local government
bodies distribute and provide several material needs for poor families; such as
coal, food, etc. When the poor families apply to the government in order to
benefit such programs they can easily be rejected depending on a claim by the
authorities of having a family member in a 'terrorist' group.
Several Initiatives but No Progress
Nationally as well as internationally, some initiatives are being taken to boost development but figures indicate that there is not being made much progress.
The most important Turkish initiative up to now for this region is ‘The Plan for Southeast Anatolia’ (GAP - project) which was launched in the 1980s. Initially, the GAP aimed to irrigate the land and to generate electricity by building 22 dams and hydraulic power stations. In time, investments in agriculture, transport, education, healthcare and social projects were also put on the agenda.
Up to now, 75 % of the investments in energy generation have been realized, while only 15 % of the planned amount of land has been irrigated. However, the irrigation is of much more importance to the local population as agriculture is the most important economic sector and creates much more jobs than electricity production. The fact that the generation of electricity gets more priority is, according to critics, the proof that GAP was not put up in the interest of the local population but in that of the rest of the country. After all, the consumption of electricity is much higher in the industrialized West – the consumption of electricity in the Southeast is estimated on 38% of the national average[12].
Furthermore, the GAP-plan completely
passes over the historical and political context of the region - which is an
eyesore for many Kurds. The word ‘Kurds’ is not even used and the consequences
of the armed conflict are totally being ignored.
Lastly,
GAP project had a serious negative effect on the ecological system of the
region. Apart from dams, irrigation projects under GAP project caused some
damages on the ecological system. But at this point, it is important to keep in
mind that it is not the irrigation project itself that caused these damages,
but the lack of integrated programs on how to irrigate, water-friendly systems
like drip irrigation, etc.
Local Municipalities
Another potential agent of development is
the local municipalities. Since 2000,
these municipalities are in the hands of the pro – Kurdish parties. But these
Kurdish municipalities have debts with the central government. The repayment of
these debts is a condition for the municipalities to be awarded grants from the
newly established local development agencies and sometimes from international
institutions such as the EU.
Because of the centralistic government
a democratic deficit can be observed in the east of Turkey. While most of the
local municipalities are elected by a very high percentage of the votes,
sometimes up to 70%, the legal and financial power in terms of policymaking is
in the hands of the governorships, who are appointed by the central government.
Education
in Mother Tongue
One of the most prioritized issues for
the Kurdish people in Turkey is education in mother tongue.
The mother tongue of 14 % of the
Turkish population is Kurdish according to academic statistics[13],
which means around 12 million people. Within the Kurdish speaking population,
46% does not have a primary education degree, which adds up to 9% of the Turkish
population as a whole. 37% of the Kurdish speaking population is illiterate[14]. For Kurdish women, the numbers are even
worse. 80% of Kurdish women did not finish primary school or is illiterate.
These numbers show that because of the mother tongue barrier most of the
Kurdish women do not have access to education.
This situation has serious effects on
the educational landscape in the Kurdish regions. When the mother tongue is
different than the official learning language, the access to education and
educational achievements of the students is decreasing, as can also be seen
with some of the migrant communities in Europe. The number of school drop outs
is very high in regions where the mother tongue is different from the learning
language. Other negative consequences for Kurdish children, and there are a lot
of them, are lack of communication, stigmatization and marginalization, passive
attitudes and problems with self confidence, not being able to develop their
own potentials.
Education in the mother tongue is a
human right and most importantly, included in the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Unfortunately, Turkey refused to ratify this article.
Secondly, the
use of the mother tongue in education is a “sine
qua non” for the preservation and development of the Kurdish language. On
the other hand, when it is forbidden to use a language in education and in the
public sphere, it remains trapped in daily life and over time it weakens and
declines. The Kurdish language is currently face to face with this danger and
the only way to ward off this danger is to use Kurdish in education.
Apart from all this,
the use of Kurdish in education will make a very positive contribution to the
solution of the Kurdish issue. In fact, the use of Kurdish in education is a
point that not only all Kurdish political groups and non-governmental
movements, but also everybody who believes that the Kurdish issue should be
solved via democratic methods, agree on.
Even though it is not enough, there are some developments
emerged during the AKP governance since 2002. First of all, in 2002 private
Kurdish courses were legally permitted; in 2009 a Kurdish channel TRT-6 was
launched which was followed by the opening of Kurdish language departments in
some universities. Although these developments took place, there is no concrete
action plan of the government that can resolve the problem of Kurdish students
who face with serious language barrier at public schools.[15]
Kurdish Children
It is important to consider the
situation children are growing up in today in the Kurdish regions. It can be
argued that under the recent circumstances, they will not grow up to be peace
supporting civilians.
According to the European Commission,[16] amongst
others, following groups of children are particularly vulnerable: children
belonging to ethnic or other minorities, displaced children, and children
affected by armed conflicts.
Unfortunately, almost all of the
Kurdish children in Turkey can be categorized in one or more of these groups.
As can be seen in a lot of problematic areas, it is clear that the burdens of
the past are the heaviest on children's shoulders. In short, some of the most
serious problems Kurdish children in Turkey are facing are chronic poverty,
leading to child labour, educational setbacks, problems with juvenile justice
and the presence of landmines in a large portion of the Kurdish regions. Underdevelopment and poverty have a very negative
effect on the lives of Kurdish children. For example, the
children under 5 mortality rate per 1000 live births is 49% in the East, while
it is only 30% in the West of
Turkey according to UNICEF. For internally displaced Kurdish children, the
number goes up to 58%.[17]
Sociological research shows that Internally Displaced Children are less likely
to attend primary school than non-displaced Turkish children (78.6% against
88.8%). IDPs suffer from less vaccination, less nutrition, acute respiratory
infection, fever, and less antenatal care compared to overall population.
In the last
years, the new Anti-Terror Law[18] (footnote 8 has important
content and should be put into the main text. But: text does not fit to the caption of this chapter)
severely limits the right to congregate and demonstrate. The right to
demonstrate has turned into a terrorist offense because of this law. This is
especially dangerous for children, who are often victims of police violence and
find themselves in prisons. According to information provided by the Turkish
Ministry of Justice, in 2006 and 2007, a total number of 2567 children were
defendants in terror-related trials. According to
UNICEF, in 2007, 45% of all minors who were put on trial did not have their trial
administered by courts specifically applicable to them such as juvenile courts.[19]
As to today, not one of the state security officials that abused children
during arrests and detentions have been put to trial. Between 2000 and 2009, 14
children died as a result of the interventions of security forces at
demonstrations and protests, all of them children living in the Southeast of
Turkey.
Turkey became party to the “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict” on 4 May
2004. Turkey submitted its initial report in December 2007 with a year delay.
If there is supposed to be no armed conflict in Turkey, children should be
provided with space to vent their dissent as well in accordance with articles
12, 13 and 15 of CRC. If this constitutes a crime, children should be dealt
within juvenile justice system in accordance with articles 37, 39, and 40 of
CRC and paragraphs 65, 66, and 67 of the Concluding Observations of CRC on
Turkey. If children are treated as members of an armed group that are distinct
from the armed forces of the State, they should be provided with “appropriate
assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social
reintegration” in accordance with Article 6 of OPAC.[20]
EU
Accession
The way in
which the EU has managed to influence the advancement of the Kurdish population
has changed dramatically in the past few years. There were clear results of EU pressure
in the past, like the decrease of torture practices, the end of the Emergency
Rule in the Region and the Compensation Law for the forced migrated people. But
in the last few years, we see that the EU, as other international entities, is
more inclined to follow the Turkish state's approach to the Kurdish issue as a
problem of terrorism. The latest resolution of the European Parliament on the
Turkish accession[21]
proves this. Despite of this, although there has been a decrease, still a big
portion of Turkish public opinion is in favor of EU accession. This means the
EU still has the power to positively affect the Turkish policies on the Kurdish
issue. As for the IPA funding, it is difficult to
measure the effects of these investments on the development of the Kurdish
regions. But it is clear that the EU and the Turkish government, who has a lot
of influence on the tendering process, does not apply any form of positive
discrimination towards the heavily underdeveloped and war affected Kurdish
region in the awarding of the funds.
For the
Kurds in Turkey, EU accession holds two big promises, one is improvement in the
human rights violations and the second is the hope that the EU will support
their demand for more political autonomy.
Democratic
Opening
It is
difficult to define what the 'democratic opening' actually is. In 2005, the Prime Minister
Erdoğan in his speech in Diyarbakir stated that he recognizes Kurdish Issue.
This was followed by “Kurdish Opening Project” in the beginning of 2009 which
changed into the “Democratic Opening Project” and ultimately to the “National Unity Project”. Through these name
changes, the changes in mentality can be easily traced. While the first name
included “Kurdish” openly, it changed to a more nationalist discourse in the
meanwhile. Today no one knows the scope of the project. For some it is a
public campaign, others say that it is an actually policy plan that hasn't been
finished yet. The democratic opening and the AKP-policies are much contested
and debated, but it remains a fact that following initiatives like the
establishment of a Kurdish speaking television channel and some Kurdish
language teaching departments ('The living languages institutes') in some
universities, Kurdish people are now finally recognized in their existence,
although not in a constitutional way unfortunately. We can say we are Kurdish and
speak Kurdish at home and in the streets without having to fear for our lives.
This is a very big achievement, but it is not enough.
Recognizing
the existence of Kurds does not recognize their pain and suffering experienced
in the last twenty years and does not bring back their loved ones, houses and
lands. Recognizing
their existence does not give them political, cultural and linguistic rights
that they are entitled to as a minority group and as human beings. These two
things have to be taken care before of we can speak of a durable solution for
the Kurdish question.
RECOMMENDATIONS
General Recommendations:
-
Turkey should lift and abolish all discriminatory amendments and
articles from both domestic and international law, especially those on minority
rights. The European
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, The European Charter on Local
Self-Government and The International Convention on the Rights of the Child
should be fully ratified and implemented. The Turkish state should abandon the
practice of interpreting international human rights conventions 'according to
the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty'.
-
Turkey's administrative structure should be decentralized in order to
be able to respond rapidly and efficiently to different regions and different
needs. Turkish Local
Authorities Law should be adjusted and revised at least according to European
Charter of Local Self-Government.
-
Reconciliation and dialogue structures should be put up in order to
overcome the violent conflicts of the past. For this aim, the government and the state should support
the civil initiatives and be a part of the discussions to form such structures.
Specific Recommendations:
Recommendations
on Mother Tongue in Education:[22]
-
Kurdish-Turkish education models that respond to different needs should
be developed for the education of Kurdish students. The design and implementation of school models
aiming at a balanced bilingualism in Kurdish and Turkish and literacy in the
two of the languages in the education of Kurdish children will play an
important role in lifting the damages and disadvantages.
-
Training should be provided for the transformation of coercive
teacher-student relations. The objective should be the effective empowerment of Kurdish students
and therefore of the Kurdish community through bilingual and multicultural
education, the elimination of existing inequalities and the resulting societal
justice.
-
Bilingual teacher-training departments should be set up. The necessary infrastructure should be prepared and relevant departments
should be opened in educational faculties for the training of teachers who will
provide Kurdish-Turkish bilingual education
-
Centers for the development and evaluation of bilingual educational
curriculum should be opened. Autonomous centres for the
development and assessment of bilingual education curriculums, which will take
into consideration the dynamic structure of bilingualism and all of its
educational processes, have to be established.
-
Public awareness should be raised concerning the use of education in
the mother tongue and bilingualism. It is very important that a sound language planning be developed in
order to transform attitudes towards Kurdish and enable positive views to
evolve.
-
Prospective teachers should be trained regarding linguistic and
cultural diversity; similar training should be provided to teachers via
in-service seminars. Educational
faculties should provide teacher trainees with pedagogical courses that provide
guidance on teaching children whose mother tongue differs from the language of
instruction.
-
Teachers who speak Kurdish should be provided resources on bilingual
educational methods. Kurdish
teachers, who from time to time choose speaking Kurdish with their Kurdish
students in an attempt to alleviate their disadvantages, should be provided
with seminars on bilingual educational methods, strategies and course
materials.
-
Teachers who do not speak Kurdish and who work in Kurdish region should
be encouraged to learn Kurdish. This will encourage an identity negotiation and may positively
contribute to Kurdish students’ school success and to alleviate the existing
social and economic inequality and discrimination.
-
Kurdish literacy courses should be offered for students who speak
Kurdish but have literacy skills only in Turkish. It is necessary to provide state-supported, free-of-charge Kurdish
literacy courses for those students who can speak Kurdish but do not know how
to write and read in Kurdish in order to re-establish certain attitudes to
language and students’ self-confidence until a good bilingual model can be
achieved.
-
Kurdish literacy courses should be offered for Kurdish parents. Such steps would help parents
become empowered and contribute to their children’s education.
-
TV programs aiming to develop students’ Kurdish language skills should
be created. The ban on children’s
programming for radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish needs to be
abolished.
Recommendations
on Forced Migration and Village Guard System
-
In
relation to the Law no.5233 (Compensation of Damages and Losses
Arising from Terror and Fight against Terrorism): The term of the law expired on 30 May 2008. The
period for appeal should be extended and compensations should be fair and
delivered without delay. Internally displaced persons as well and NGO representatives
should have their say in the enforcement of the legislation.
-
In relation to the Village Return and
Rehabilitation Project: Under this project which was
first launched in 1999, those people who apply to respective Governorates to
return back to their villages are entitled to assistance such as construction
materials to rebuild their houses or in kind materials such as live animals or
beehives for subsistence given that there is no security barrier to their
return. However, the actual number of
persons returning to their villages under this project is rather limited since
the State allows return only to those settlements which it considers “secure.”
Furthermore, villages have been utterly damaged and with very poor
infrastructure. The village guard system should be abolished and
return should be possible to all villages. Infrastructure problems of rural
settlements should be solved and comprehensive rural development schemes should
be introduced including interventions in education, training, production and
marketing.
-
For
those preferring to stay in their new settlements rather than returning back:
Programmes should be introduced for the rehabilitation of newly settled persons
and necessary support should be extended to make these victims economically
productive again. There is need for integrated programmes to improve the living
conditions of new settlers in their present neighbourhoods inhabited by
internally displaced persons. There is urgent need to improve the housing
conditions of those who have preferred to move to urban centres.
-
Along
with these, the State should officially admit the problem of internal
displacement and mutual trust between the State and victims should be restored by
launching a reconciliation process.
-
The village guards system must be
abolished. The village guards should be disarmed and their re-integration with
social life should start immediately. Since village guard system and its social
consequences are not known except from the data provided by the Ministry of Interior,
it is hard to further elaborate on the recommendations. The first, and the most
important, step to further develop recommendations is to conduct research on
village guard system that can provide the knowledge on what are the social,
political, cultural and economic consequences of the system and how the system
can be abolished.
Recommendations
on Socio-Economic Development
For any improvement of the socioeconomic status of the
region, political will from the Government is a must. Secondly, it must be
stressed that no minor or palliative measures would suffice to significantly
improve the situation in the region. This requires comprehensive, well
programmed and parallel transformations in many areas.
-
The irrigation projects under the GAP Project should be completed in shortest time
possible by paying
attention to the ecological balance of the Region. This irrigation projects should
continue hand to hand with trainings on environmental irrigation techniques…etc.
-
Improvements in
health and education infrastructure in the region are essential.
-
Emphasis should
be given to vocational training in order to build and strengthen human capital
in the region.
-
There is an
urgent need to build and improve infrastructure in urban centres to make these
spaces fit for decent living.
-
A special
system of incentives (maybe regional or sector based) to attract investments to
the region.
-
Besides
clearance work (mine sweeping), special programmes for mine victims should be
launched. Firstly there must be basic data collection in relation to mine
victims[23]
and until all mines are cleared school children in the region must be informed
and trained about mines and associated threats. At present, there are no
warning sign in mined areas. Civilians should be informed about mined areas and
such areas should be publicly announced. Otherwise explosions and accidents
leading to serious injuries and deaths will continue.
-
A portion of the income derived from the Kurdish' region's natural
resources (water, energy, mines, oil, etc) should be
spent for regional development and meeting the basic needs of the most deprived
children and families.
-
The European Charter
of Local Self-government should be ratified to open the way to administrative
and financial autonomy, at least.
-
Special efforts should
be spent for the transfer of the EU structural adjustment funds to the region, i.e. positive
discrimination should be
applied.
-
Turkey
should stick to clauses of Ottawa Convention. Turkey became a State Party to the agreement known as Ottawa Convention
on 25 September 2003. According to the
2004 report on Turkey of the Landmine Monitor, 936,663 landmines were laid on
the territory within the period 1957-1998. According to the same report, Turkey
declared that she placed 39,569 mines only in the period 1989-1992 around
security installations located in “eastern and South-eastern Regions.” The
stock of mines declared by Turkey is 3,039,472. According to the Convention,
this stock had to be destroyed until 1 March 2004, but no official statement
was made so far on this issue. Again under the Ottawa Convention, Turkey has to
clear all mines until 1 March 2014.
Recommendations for the Treatment of Children
-
Turkish
government should ensure the right to peaceful demonstrations for both adults
and minors in Southeast Turkey.
-
Amend anti-terrorism legislation;
prevent unfair prosecutions under anti-terrorism legislation by bringing the
definition of, terrorism in Turkish law into line with international standards
and norms, notably the principles of legality and legal certainty.
-
Detention: Ensure that children are
detained only as a last resort and for the shortest period possible; where
there is no alternative, ensure that the manner of detention takes into account
the needs of their age; ensure that children are provided with immediate legal
assistance upon apprehension and during questioning. Ensure that children are
not held in adult detention facilities. When detention is unavoidable, ensure
that specialist facilities are available for the detention of children; inform
the child’s family without delay regarding where the child is being detained
and allow them to have contact with the child.
-
Turkish government should live up to
its procedural and legal obligations under the ICRC (International Convention on the Rights of the Child) and submit
periodic reports.
-
EU should actively monitor the situation of Kurdish children in Turkey
and ensure that their needs are addressed as a central part of the reform
process.
[1] According to
Hacattepe Üniversity research supported by the interior minister, the number is
between 900000-1.200.000 (Türkiye Göç ve Yerinden Olmuş Nüfus Araştırması,
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etüdleri Enstitüsü, Ankara, Aralık 2006).
According to Human Rights Association and Human Rights Watch, the number is
between 1.500.000-3.000.000 (www.ihd.org , www.hrw.org).
[2] According to data provided by the Ministry of Interior 118, 463 appeals
have been concluded, 78,233 appeals have been provided redress and 40,000
appeals have been rejected till 2008. (www.icisleri.gov.tr)
.
[3] 442 Sayılı Köy
Kanunu (http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/368.html)
[4] İHD: 1990-2002
Yıllarına Ait Korucuların Neden Olduğu İhlaller Raporu, Human Rights
Association, 2005. (www.ihd.org.tr)
[6] “Region”
stands for the Kurdish provinces of East and Southeast of Turkey. It
will be used as such, hereafter.
[7] The system also generated a crime
system. Within 1985-2006, 5000 village guards committed to a crime (Village
Guards Report, Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2006).
[8] World Bank: Turkey: Country
Assistance Strategy Progress Report (2001)
[9] Union of Southeastern Anatolia Region Municipalities and
Diyarbakir Metropolitan Municipality: 'Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia:
Socio-economic Problems and Recommended Solutions (November 2008)
[10] With the AKP KOYDES Program most of the villages in
Turkey now have roads and water. KOYDES is a rural development program launched
by AKP in 2005. Under this program %86 of the villages in Turkey now have
drinking water, thousands of villages have roads and bridges that link them to
cities; all of which that they didn’t have before.
[11] There
are 617,000 green card holders in Diyarbakır only and this figure corresponds
to 41% of the population of the province (Diyarbakir Governorship Statistics,
2008)
[12]
Source: Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia: Socio- economic Problems and
Recommended Soltions, GABB (Union of South East Anatolian Region
Municipalities) Report, November 2008, Diyarbakır.
[13] Gürsel, Kolaşin, Altındağ,
“Anadili Kürtçe olan Nüfusla Anadili Türkçe olan Nüfus Arasında Eğitim Uçumu
Var”, Bahçeşehir University, BETAM, Research Note 09/49, 13.10.2009.
[14] Gürsel, Kolaşin, Altındağ,
“Anadili Kürtçe olan Nüfusla Anadili Türkçe olan Nüfus Arasında Eğitim Uçumu
Var”, Bahçeşehir University, BETAM, Research Note 09/49, 13.10.2009.
[15] For a
deeper analysis see DİSA’s (Diyarbakir Institute for Political and Social
Research) book: Coskun, V.; Uçarlar, N. And Derince, M.Ş., Scar of Toungue: Consequences of the Ban on the Use of Mother Tongue in
Education and Experiences of Kurdish Students in Turkey, Diyarbakir, DİSA
Publications: 2010. (http://www.disa.org.tr/files/documents/scaroftongue.pdf)
[16] A special place for children in EU
external action: Communication from the Commision to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Comittee and the Committee of the Regions (february 2008)
[17] Unicef
in Turkey: Country Profile (http://www.unicef.org/turkey/ut/ut2_2010.html)
[18] Amnesty
International has long expressed concerns that the definition of terrorism in
Turkish law is overly broad, vague and fails to meet the level of legal
certainty required in criminal law. Similar concerns have been expressed by the
UN’s Special Reporter on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while countering terrorism. In the Anti-Terrorism Law,
Article 1 defines terrorism mainly in terms of its aims – not its tactics -
including “any kind of act” aimed at “changing the characteristics of the
Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social,
secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with
its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and
Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State,
eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and
external security of the State, public order or general health by means of
pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat”. As
the Special Reporter noted, the law is not restricted to criminalizing tactics
employed in furtherance of these aims that amount to deadly or otherwise grave
violence against persons. Instead the provision is applicable to any kind of act
that entails “pressure, force, violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or
threat”. Thus, terrorism in Turkey can be considered a thought crime in some
cases. Amnesty International: All Children have
Rights: End Unfair Prosecutions of Children under the Anti terror Legislation
in Turkey (2010)
[19] Unicef Turkey: Field visit report
On Children Deemed to be Terrorist Offenders by Participating in Demonstrations
(2009)
[20] Amnesty International: All Children
have Rights: End Unfair Prosecutions of Children under the Anti terror
Legislation in Turkey (2010)
[21] European
Parliament resolution of 9 March 2011 on Turkey’s 2010 progress report
[22] All of the recommendations on mother tongue in education were
written from DİSA’s book and further recommendations can be found in the book: Coskun,
V.; Uçarlar, N. And Derince, M.Ş., Scar
of Toungue: Consequences of the Ban on the Use of Mother Tongue in Education
and Experiences of Kurdish Students in Turkey, Diyarbakir, DİSA Publications:
2010. http://www.disa.org.tr/files/documents/scaroftongue.pdf)
[23]
At present there is no data on mine victims in Turkey. According to the Group for Building Awareness on Mines and
Military Remains, there are 1,070 civilian cases only in the province of
Hakkari (Hakkari
Landmine Research 2007, DUY-DER, Diyarbakır)
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